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ABSTRACT
The Pension Funds Second Amendment Act, 2001 required funds to provide statutory minimum 
benefits for exiting members and pensioners. Any surplus arising at the statutory valuation 
following the promulgation of this Act was to be distributed—initially to former members and 
pensioners to top up their benefits to the statutory minimum, and then equitably to all stakeholders. 
Surplus available in retirement funds was originally estimated at R80bn, but the surplus distributed 
by May 2012 was only about R47,6bn. This paper considers some reasons for this discrepancy and, 
in particular, gives an analysis of 447 surplus valuation reports. It shows that, by strengthening 
their valuation assumptions and motivating contingency reserves, actuaries reduced the surplus by 
R10bn for these 447 funds. The paper questions whether the strengthening of valuation bases was 
justified and examines critically the new actuarial methods introduced following the promulgation 
of the Act.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Before the promulgation of the Pension Funds Second Amendment Act (PFSAA)1 
on 7 December 2001, the surplus in retirement funds was estimated at R80bn.2 Section 
15B of the PFSAA required that the surplus at the statutory valuation following the 
promulgation of the Act (the ‘surplus valuation’) should be distributed.
1.2 At a Financial Services Board (FSB) feedback session on 30 May 2012, the 
Chief Actuary said that R47.6bn had been distributed to date with 200 schemes still to 
be approved. This paper considers some of the reasons for the R32.4bn discrepancy, 
and focuses on the changes to the actuarial assumptions and methodologies that were 
introduced after the promulgation of the PFSAA.
1.3 Late in 2004 a valuator from a well-known consultancy was overheard by one of 
the authors at a social occasion being asked about the implications of the PFSAA. His 
answer, “Surplus? What surplus?” forms the main title of this paper since he went on to 
imply that, in most cases, PF1173 gave enough latitude to absorb any surplus that might 
be available.
1.4 Most of the results of the paper are based on a very substantial sample of the 
surplus valuation reports of defined benefit (DB) funds (or, in many cases, the DB 
sections of hybrid funds). The surplus valuation reports of defined contribution (DC) 
funds were not analysed.
1.5 The authors did not read each valuation report in full. Rather, the analysis of 
surplus and other information from each of the reports was captured on a database. These 
aggregate figures will obscure some of the more subtle elements of the valuations, but 
given the size of the sample, the trends observed nonetheless revealed important features 
of the surplus-distribution exercise.
1.6 The discussion necessarily depends on interpretation of the PFSAA. The authors 
have no legal training but have relied on a plain reading of the PFSAA and in addition 
have consulted Advocates Breitenbach, Greig and Duminy separately on different legal 
points. The interpretations given, however, remain those of the authors. There is perhaps 
an issue beyond mere interpretation or compliance and that is the requirement that 
actuaries act in the public interest. A precise definition of ‘public interest’ is beyond the 
scope of this paper but one can ask whether the intention or spirit of the legislation has 
been well-served by its implementation.
1 Act no. 39 of 2001 as amended
2 S. Mabotja. Pension Fund Surpluses: Who gets the R80bn Bonsela, Financial Mail, 1998
3 Pension Fund Circular PF117, Registrar of Pension Fund, July 2004
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1.7 The thesis of the paper is that some of the strengthening of valuation assumptions 
and changes in methods introduced at the surplus valuation are not supported by the 
experience in the funds, are not encouraged by legislation and are perhaps contrary to 
generally accepted actuarial principles.
2. THE CONTEXT OF THE SECTION 15B SURPLUS DISTRIBUTION
2.1 BACKGROUND
2.1.1 The PFSAA partially addresses two historical issues:
(1)  Members who left a fund before retirement might not have received their 
full actuarial reserve and pension increases might not have kept pace with 
inflation; and
(2)  the ownership of any actuarial surplus arising in a fund needed resolution.
2.1.2 Andrew (2004) sets out the history:
 – Milburn-Pyle & Lennox (1990) argued that, in a DB fund, any surplus represents 
over-payment by the employer and the employer must approve any use of surplus;
 – in 1997 a Draft Bill on Surplus Repatriation was tabled in parliament. The concept 
of minimum benefits (including pension increases) was introduced. ‘Repatriation’ of 
surplus meant the transfer of surplus to employers;
 – the publicity surrounding the Kransdorff case was the first public indication that the 
labour movement was contemplating legal action concerning past transfer terms;
 – in March 1999, consultation commenced between the FSB and COSATU. Following 
complaints from business, the matter was referred to NEDLAC;
 – in August 2000 the NEDLAC negotiations deadlocked;
 – a Government team proceeded to draft a bill; and
 – after four weeks of hearings before the Portfolio Committee on Finance and 
deliberation on the clauses of the Bill, members of all political parties agreed on 
changes to be made to the Bill.
2.1.3 The PFSAA came into effect on 7 December 2001.
2.2 THE PENSION FUNDS SECOND AMENDMENT ACT
2.2.1 The PFSAA establishes statutory minimum benefits for exiting members 
and pensioners. Briefly, for DB funds:
 – the minimum benefit for members who leave the fund before retirement is the value 
of the accrued pension benefit at the date of exit, the basis of calculation being left to 
the discretion of the Registrar of Pension Funds (“the Registrar”); and
 – funds must institute a pension increase policy to be applied annually and pensions 
must be increased in line with inflation at least at each statutory valuation of a fund, 
subject to affordability criteria.
2.2.2 Andrew (op. cit.) sets out the conflicting positions of labour and business 
in August 2000 when discussions crystallised into a deadlock:
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Labour’s position was that:
 — former members who had transferred to a DC fund should have received at least their 
accrued liability multiplied by the ratio of the fair value of assets to the actuarial value 
of assets, and past transfers should be amended to reflect this; and
 — actuarial surplus belonged to the retirement fund and should be used for the benefit 
of the members of that fund unless it could be shown to have resulted from deliberate 
over-contribution by the employer (i.e. payment by the employer of more than the 
amount recommended by the actuary).
Business’s position was that:
 — any actuarial surplus had arisen because of overly conservative assumptions relative to 
the experience of the fund; and therefore had resulted, in effect, from the payment by 
the employer of more contributions than had actually been required;
 —the members had no rights to the surplus; and
 —the employer had the right to use any actuarial surplus to fund a contribution holiday.
2.2.3 In respect of surplus, the PFSAA was therefore a compromise: business 
would have no absolute right to surplus, but neither would there be full restitution of 
former member benefits as demanded by labour. Restitution would be extended to 
all former members,4 but only if there was sufficient actuarial surplus at the actuarial 
valuation following the promulgation of the PFSAA. In such cases, there would be a 
compulsory distribution of surplus, but thereafter the former members’ rights would 
cease. Funds would not be compelled to distribute surplus arising after the initial 
distribution date, but the rules governing any such future distributions were legislated.
2.3 WHAT SURPLUS?
2.3.1 It is clear from the Pension Funds Act, 1956 (“the Act”)5 and the PFSAA 
that the surplus valuation is a financial-soundness valuation to determine both the 
reserves to be held and the contribution rate required in the future.
2.3.2 The PFSAA defines actuarial surplus for DB funds as the difference 
between:
(a)  the actuarial value of assets less member and employer surplus accounts; and
(b)  the actuarial value of accrued liabilities plus contingency reserve accounts.
2.3.3 A contingency reserve account may be established by the board of a fund 
on the advice of the valuator to provide for explicit contingencies.
2.3.4 On 22 April 2003 the Minister of Finance issued regulation 35 to the 
PFSAA:
(1) By virtue of the fact that–
   (a)  the Act vests power in boards of funds to establish contingency reserve accounts; 
and
4 As defined in the PFSAA.
5 Act no. 24 of 1956 as amended
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   (b)  the establishment of contingency reserve accounts reduces the actuarial surplus 
available for apportionment and increases the possibility that actuarial surplus 
may be insufficient to enhance benefits previously paid to former members to the 
level prescribed in section 15B(5)(b) of the Act,
no fund may, with effect from the date of commencement of this regulation, establish any 
contingency reserve account under circumstances where a reasonable inference may be 
made that the establishment of the account is contrary to the duties of the relevant board 
under section 7C(2)(b) of the Act and motivated by bad faith.
(2) The establishment and magnitude of any contingency reserve account by a fund–
   (a)  must be motivated by the valuator in the relevant report on the statutory actuarial 
valuation; and
   (b)  may, where the Registrar is not satisfied with any such motivation, be rejected by 
the Registrar
Section 7C of the Act requires the board of a fund to act in good faith with due care and 
diligence.
2.3.5 The Minister of Finance is therefore concerned that funds may establish 
contingency reserve accounts in bad faith in order to deny former members access to the 
surplus in the fund.
2.3.6 Contingency reserves may be established only for explicit contingen-
cies. In terms of standard actuarial practice, the valuator should have identified all such 
contingencies at the previous valuation (with the exception of those that might only have 
arisen since the previous valuation, such as surplus-distribution expenses) and will have 
placed a value on them, albeit via implicit margins in the assumptions.
2.3.7 It can be confirmed from various sources that the valuation assumptions 
used before the promulgation of the PFSAA contained margins for prudence:
 – the position of business at the NEDLAC negotiations was that surplus arose from 
overly conservative assumptions relative to the experience of the fund (Andrew, 
2004);
 – Gluckman & Kamionsky (1997) contend that most actuarial valuation bases contain 
various margins for conservatism;
 – Andrew (1998) states that conservative assumptions are commonplace;
 – as discussed in section 4.5.5, the previous assumptions generated an overall surplus; 
and
 – historically, implicit margins were considered by the actuarial profession and the 
Registrar to be sufficiently prudent for financial soundness.
2.3.8 The PFSAA therefore does not particularly require a strengthening 
of valuation assumptions, nor is it likely that the legislature envisaged any change in 
the meaning of ‘surplus’. By issuing regulation 35, the Minister of Finance seems to 
encourage a close scrutiny of existing margins for prudence because any excessive 
margins would reduce the likelihood of benefit restitution.
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2.4 PENSION FUND CIRCULAR PF117
2.4.1 THE ISSUANCE OF THE CIrCUlAr
2.4.1.1 In July 2004 the Chief Actuary, acting for the Registrar, issued Pension 
Fund Circular PF117. This circular introduced new and untested methods. Unlike 
regulation 35, which has the effect of being law, the Registrar’s circulars are not law but 
reflect what the Registrar would normally find acceptable. Furthermore, the Registrar is 
still required to apply his mind in each case when he exercises his discretion.
2.4.1.2 In many previous valuations, the degree of prudence in a basis was not 
easily quantifiable because of the implicit margins in the various assumptions. This lack 
of transparency was now less acceptable because of the requirements and implications 
of regulation 35. PF117 sought to address this by requiring ‘best-estimate’ assumptions 
(i.e. no margins for prudence) combined with explicit contingency reserves. One of these 
contingency reserves was a ‘solvency reserve’ which could be a transparent repository of 
‘prudence’.
2.4.2 PrOblEMS wITH THE CIrCUlAr
2.4.2.1 The authors’ view is that there are technical difficulties with PF117.
2.4.2.2 The authors support the above move to transparency but find the further 
imposition of the no-deficit clause to be actuarially unjustifiable. The no-deficit clause 
states that any contingency reserves, including the solvency reserve, cannot put the 
fund into a deficit. One exception to this is the investment reserve. Previously, a fund in 
deficit would be required to set up a ‘scheme of contribution’ (i.e. increased employers’ 
contributions for a period) in order to restore the financial soundness.
2.4.2.3 The no-deficit clause effectively implies that a contingency reserve is 
important enough to deprive a former member of restitution but not important enough to 
require the employer to increase contributions for a period.
2.4.2.4 The no-deficit clause decouples the reserving basis from the funding 
basis, i.e. funding must be on a best-estimate basis while the reserving can be anything 
from a best-estimate basis up to a very conservative basis (the full range allowed by 
PF117), simply depending on how much surplus would be revealed.
2.4.2.5 The option to reduce calculated actuarial reserves for explicit 
contingencies if there are insufficient assets to cover them is an unconventional approach 
and could place funds in jeopardy.
2.4.2.6 Funding on a best-estimate basis (which by the definition used by 
the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA)6 would have a 50% chance of being 
inadequate) has not been the past practice in South Africa. The authors ask whether the 
public would accept a 50% risk that assets will be insufficient to meet future benefits as 
being ‘financially sound’ and that, if the public were aware of this, whether they would 
call into question the credibility of the actuarial profession and the Registrar.
6 Letter from the Chairman of the Retirement Matters Committee to the editor of Personal 
Finance dated 11 December 2007.
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2.4.2.7 Investment reserves are allowed to put a fund into a deficit, but PF117 
also allows the option of eliminating investment reserves by reclassifying them as part of 
the solvency reserve. Solvency reserves may be reduced or set to nil if there are insuffi-
cient assets. The adoption of this approach to reduce reserves could leave funds exposed 
to market fluctuations. In implementing PF117, many funds adopted a market-value 
 approach to assets and only 21 of the sample of 447 still retained investment reserves.
2.4.3 THE EFFECTS OF THE CIrCUlAr
2.4.3.1 Actuaries could therefore find themselves in a dilemma where they 
wished to set up prudent reserves that would put the fund into deficit, but were prevented 
from doing so by PF117. A deficit would require increased employers’ contributions to 
restore financial soundness. So applying PF117 would, in such cases, have the effect of 
perpetuating an unsound condition. It appears from the analysis of the sample given in 
section 4 that the way many actuaries dealt with this dilemma, whether consciously or 
not, was to use a ‘best-estimate’ basis that was not really a best estimate, but rather more 
prudent (in most cases stronger than their previous ‘prudent’ basis).
2.4.3.2 Nonetheless, the bases set out in PF117 for the various contingency 
reserves allowed actuaries to substantially increase their reserves relative to the previous 
conservative reserving basis. Importantly, however, PF117 did not actually require 
actuaries to strengthen their valuation assumptions or to motivate contingency reserves. 
That responsibility remains with the actuary and, in the case of contingency reserve 
accounts, is constrained by regulation 35.
2.4.3.3 In cases where the Registrar’s guidance conflicts with the provisions of 
the Act and regulations, the Act and regulations should prevail.
2.4.3.4 One consequence of the no-deficit condition is the relatively large 
number of schemes on precisely 100% funding level (87 of the sample of 447, of which 
34 were brought to 100% with the use of a surplus expense reserve). Previously this was 
a relatively unusual result. There is no special provision in the PFSAA for a nil surplus.
2.4.3.5 The authors’ concern with this method of reserving is not universal, by 
any means. An alternative viewpoint is expressed by the Chair of the Retirement Matters 
Committee of the Actuarial Society writing to the Editor of Personal Finance on behalf 
of the Society. He says that “By definition, a ‘best estimate’ valuation means that there is 
a 50% chance that the assets will not be sufficient to meet future benefit payments” and 
“ASSA thus supports the retention of an appropriate solvency reserve”. Then later, with 
reference to the ‘no deficit’ condition he writes, “ASSA supports the approach that the 
fund is financially sound even if the solvency reserve is not fully covered by the assets” 
and “if for some reason the fund was to terminate on the valuation date, members would 
receive the full value of their accrued benefits”. The Chair of the Retirement Matters 
Committee seems to find it acceptable that members should be satisfied with a value 
that has only a 50% chance of meeting their future benefit payments. It is possible that 
the Editor of Personal Finance was satisfied by this argument, but the authors remain 
unconvinced and submit that, if this method is to become entrenched, further research is 
needed.
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2.5 THE STANDARD BANK APPEAL
2.5.1 The Standard Bank appeal7 arose from two discrepant surplus valuations 
of the Standard Bank Group Retirement Fund. The initial surplus valuation, issued by 
Mr M.J. Codron, reflected a substantial surplus. (The precise amount of surplus was 
not recorded in the Board of Appeal’s determination.) Mr Codron was subsequently 
appointed as the Chief Actuary to the FSB and, in this capacity, could no longer consult 
to the Standard Bank Group Retirement Fund. A second valuation was performed by Mr 
M.G. Hayes and reflected a nil surplus.
2.5.2 Concerned by the discrepancy, the Registrar took the matter to the Board 
of Appeal. The Board of Appeal referred the matter back to the Registrar, asking him to 
consider the matter afresh in the light of the principles set out in the determination.
2.5.3 The Board of Appeal ruled that the Registrar cannot reject “a report based 
on actuarial assumptions which fall within the range of reasonably acceptable actuarial 
assumptions” merely because the Registrar would prefer other assumptions. On the other 
hand, the Registrar “would not be precluded from rejecting a report merely because it is 
based on assumptions that fall within a broad range of acceptable actuarial assumptions.” 
In rejecting a report, the Registrar could take into account factors outside purely actuarial 
considerations such as the nature, size and history (particularly the financial history) of 
the Fund. Moreover, the Registrar would be entitled to look at how events on which the 
actuary prognosticated, have unfolded between the valuation date and the date at which 
the Registrar makes his determination.
2.5.4 There is probably a prevailing notion amongst valuators that the Registrar 
is constrained to accept valuations whose assumptions fall within ‘generally accepted 
norms and standards’ (cf. e.g. Lowther, 2011), but the Board of Appeal ruled against such 
a notion.
2.5.5 One problem is that nowhere is it explicitly set out—nor is it perhaps 
entirely clear—what a ‘reasonably acceptable’ set of assumptions would be. Here we 
have an example of two senior valuators coming up with two very different results, one 
of which would presumably have had a very significant adverse effect on the distribution 
of surplus to former members. We shall see from the analysis of the sample that 
‘reasonably acceptable’ norms have resulted in a very considerable range of results (from 
a weakening of over 40% to a strengthening of over 60% on the previous valuation basis). 
The profession has traditionally defended the independence of valuators in exercising 
their actuarial judgement. Any move towards prescription or constraint on assumptions 
has been resisted. While the authors do not, at this stage, advocate prescription, they do 
wonder if the results discussed in section 4.1 and detailed in Table A.1 of Appendix A 
do not give pause for some professional introspection and argue for a greater degree of 
self-regulation.
2.5.6 In a pre-appeal meeting, an agreement was reached between the Registrar 
and the Fund. One of the points of agreement was that the Registrar “is not entitled 
7 In the appeal between Standard Bank Group Retirement Fund (appellant) and Registrar of 
Pension Funds (respondent), Board of Appeal, 2007
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to have regard to the consequences that a particular valuation may have for actual or 
potential stakeholders.” As noted in section 2.3.4, however, regulation 35 specifically 
requires the actuary and the Registrar to consider the effect that contingency reserves 
will have on the potential for former members to receive a top-up of their benefit to the 
statutory minimum benefit.
2.6 THE PUblIC INTErEST
2.6.1 In terms of the Professional Conduct Standards issued by the Professional 
Affairs Board of the Faculty and Institute of Actuaries,8 members of ASSA are bound to 
act in the public interest. This document states:
The Actuarial Profession has an obligation to serve the public interest. Collectively it 
seeks to do so by informed contribution to debate on matters of public interest and by 
influencing those with power to protect and enhance the public interest. Individually 
members must maintain and observe the highest standards of conduct. The standing of the 
profession depends on the public’s judgement both of this collective contribution to debate 
on matters of public interest and of the actions and behaviour of individual members.
2.6.2 It is worth summarising the public-interest case for the distribution of 
surplus to top up former members’ benefits to the statutory minimum benefit:
 – Historically, exiting members were inequitably treated in comparison with members 
who retired from the fund to the extent that the former members did not receive their 
actuarial reserve on exit.
 – To the extent that surplus on exit prior to retirement was not anticipated in the 
actuarial basis, surplus would be generated in the fund and would accumulate with 
fund returns. This surplus might have been distributed to other stakeholders by way of 
contribution holidays, pension increases or benefit improvements.
 – Ideally there should be full restitution of benefits to former members. The burden on 
the fund and consequently the employer, however, makes full restitution impractical.
 – Therefore restitution of benefits to former members will be compulsory only if there 
is sufficient actuarial surplus in the fund.
2.6.3 The actuarial profession’s view on the ownership of surplus is 
documented by Andrew (unpublished), who notes that the aims of the PFSAA did not 
enjoy widespread support within the actuarial profession.
2.6.4 If the aims of the PFSAA (in making restitution to former members where 
reasonably possible) have, to some extent, been thwarted by actions and decisions of the 
members of the profession, then to that extent they have not acted in the public interest.
2.7 THE STATUTOrY MINIMUM bENEFIT
2.7.1 The basis of calculation of the statutory minimum benefit at the date of 
exit is set out in Board Notice 35 (BN35) issued by the Registrar. The basis of calculation 
8 Faculty and Institute of Actuaries. Professional conduct standards, 1999
SAAJ 12 (2012)
106 | DID THE PENSION FUNDS SECOND AMENDMENT ACT ACHIEVE ITS AIMS?
is different for former members as compared with active members. Actual returns and 
inflation between the date of exit and the surplus apportionment date are taken into 
account in the calculation of the statutory minimum benefit for former members. Margins 
for prudence are effectively stripped out for that period in respect of former members. 
The minimum benefits for active members, on the other hand, are calculated on a partly 
prescribed basis, which includes margins for prudence. For a former member, PFSAA 
requires the minimum benefit to be calculated at the date of exit and this forms the basis 
for a possible allocation of surplus to the former member. The spirit of PFSAA, as the 
authors understand it, would be to aim to give each former member a minimum benefit 
calculated at the time of exit. The effect of BN35, however, is not to calculate the minimum 
benefit at the time of exit (as if they were an active member), but retrospectively, taking 
events after the date of exit into account. There is no requirement in the legislation for 
former members to be treated differently from other members. The authors submit that 
this inequitable treatment may have generally been to the disadvantage of the former 
members in reducing the allocation of surplus to them.
2.7.2 The effect of this difference has been calculated for a hypothetical 
sample and the results are set out in Table A.2 of Appendix A. The actual difference will 
vary from case to case and will depend on the date of exit, the normal retirement date, the 
surplus apportionment date and the actual returns achieved by the fund between the date 
of exit and the surplus apportionment date. In the sample given in Table A.2, the former 
member’s benefit is less than an equivalent active member’s benefit in every single case, 
the largest difference being 52%. It was considered beyond the scope of this paper to 
undertake a more thorough investigation involving a larger sample going back to exits 
in the early 1980s, but it is suggested that it would be worthwhile to undertake further 
research to establish more clearly the effects of BN35.
2.7.3 Some commentators have suggested that the removal of the margins 
for former members is justified because the allocation of actual returns to the date of 
settlement will effectively replace any margins that have been removed. The authors 
agree that actual investment returns should be allocated (as required by the PFSAA) 
but question whether it is justified to reduce the statutory minimum benefit at the date 
of exit for former members. To illustrate the point, the Registrar does not require 
unclaimed benefits to be recalculated on a different basis when they are eventually 
claimed. The minimum benefit is determined at date of exit and then fixed until claimed 
with interest. The authors do not think that the PFSAA intended former members to get 
different statutory minimum benefits, and such differential treatment in the calculation 
of the statutory minimum benefit may breach the constitutional right to administrative 
justice.
2.7.4 The reader may feel that too much of a fuss is being made of the effects 
of BN35, especially as it still requires investigation of a wider range of examples, but 
it should be understood that there is a gearing effect. Consider a simple example where 
a former member’s actual exit benefit was R7 000, her minimum benefit (as per BN35) 
was R10 000 and her minimum benefit (as per active calculation) was R15 000. In such 
a case, the increase in top-up surplus allocation to the former member would be about 
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167% (provided enough surplus is actually available). Furthermore, the former member’s 
allocation of any residual surplus (after topping up former members’ benefits) would also 
be based on the lower amount.
2.7.5 Given the scale of the differential between benefits in Table A.2 it is 
worth considering whether the margins in the Registrar’s basis for the minimum benefit 
are not excessive. The PFSAA requires the benefit to be determined on a ‘fair value’ 
basis. While this term is not defined in the PFSAA it would seem to be unfair to the 
other stakeholders if, in most cases, the minimum benefit turned out to be greater than 
the actuarial reserve value held in the fund. In such a situation the employer would have 
to make up the difference, or the surplus available for future distribution to stakeholders 
would be reduced. There would also appear to be a perverse incentive for members to 
resign in order to cash in their benefits. There may therefore be a case to be made that the 
margins in the statutory basis used for the calculation should be reconsidered.
3. DATA
3.1 Statutory actuarial valuation reports are public documents. In terms of the Promo-
tion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (PAIA)9 the Registrar undertook to provide the 
valuation reports of all DB funds under Section 15B of the PFSAA in an electronic format.
3.2 Six compact discs containing a total of 1065 documents were received from 
the Registrar. (Two further discs with a total of 80 documents were received at a late 
stage in the research and were consequently not included in the data.) Six hundred and 
fourteen (614) of these documents were valuation reports that fell within the range of 
dates envisaged in section 15B of the PFSAA. One of the reports was for an umbrella 
fund with 46 participating employers.
3.3 In some cases the reports were poorly scanned— for example, pages were missing 
or off-centre. Some reports used shading in their tables that rendered the table contents 
illegible when scanned. In these cases, the data were reconstructed, where possible, by 
referring to the values outside the tables. Where it was not possible to reconstruct all the 
essential information, these reports were omitted from the study.
3.4 The elimination of poorly scanned reports, duplicates, funds with no DB members 
and no pensioners, and schemes that had only a very small section of DB membership 
reduced the number of reports to 512. Of these, 65 did not have an analysis of surplus, 
or the analysis of surplus was illegible. The study is based on the remaining 447 reports. 
Any DC sections in the 447 DB funds were excluded from the data. A few of the reports 
were not signed and dated. These cases were included in the sample and where necessary 
the FSB date stamp was used to categorise the valuations.
9 Act no. 2 of 2000 as amended
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3.5 Correspondence with the Chief Actuary indicates that 707 DB valuations in terms 
of section 15B had been accepted by the Registrar as at 15 March 2011. The data are 
therefore not complete. Nevertheless, they do constitute a substantial sample.
3.6 The data were captured by one of the authors and checked by a research 
assistant. The second author checked for reasonability and reviewed the extreme cases 
and other anomalies, which resulted in further changes. Because an analysis of surplus 
should reconcile the surplus at the previous valuation with the current surplus, there 
is an inherent check on the accuracy of the captured data. In cases where the analysis 
of surplus did not reconcile in the actual valuation report, the difference was added to 
the unallocated experience item. Cases in which the analysis of surplus reconciled to 
an interim valuation instead of the previous statutory valuation were included in the 
analysis. It was considered that this would not appreciably distort the results. In those 
instances in which a figure for ‘interest on surplus’ was not explicitly stated in the 
report, an estimate was made using the interest assumption in the previous valuation, 
if available. No adjustment to the analysis of surplus was made in cases in which the 
interest assumption in the previous valuation was not given in the valuation report.
4. RESULTS AND COMMENTARY
4.1 BEST-ESTIMATE VALUATIONS
4.1.1 Historically, as discussed in section 2.3.7, actuaries included implicit 
margins for prudence in their valuation assumptions. PF117, which was issued on 28 June 
2004, required actuaries to strip out these margins and report a best-estimate valuation 
basis. One would generally expect, therefore, that the best-estimate basis would be 
weaker than the previous basis. Table 1 shows the surplus arising from the change to 
a best-estimate basis. In this table a positive percentage indicates a weaker basis and a 
negative indicates a stronger basis.
Table 1. Surplus arising from the change to a best-estimate basis (R millions)
Category Number of funds
Surplus from 
basis change % of liability
Contingency 
reserves % of liability
Signed off before 
1/9/2004
72 2 783 7,0% –1 349 –3,4%
Basis unchanged 35 0 0,0% –133 –0,5%
Best estimate weaker 118 1 778 6,8% –1 881 –7,2%
Best estimate stronger 222 –7 493 –12,5% –3 633 –6,1%
Total 447 –2 932 –1,9% –6 996 –4,6%
4.1.2 The cut-off of 1 September 2004 was based on the assumption that 
valuators would need at most two months to begin implementing PF117. The 72 schemes 
signed off before that date could be regarded as not having been influenced by PF117, 
except to the extent that some of the valuators may have been involved in the production 
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of PF117. For these funds there was a weakening in the overall basis of 3,6% on average 
(taking into account contingency reserves). The data in Table A.1 show that, before 
PF117, just over half the bases remained the same or were weakened, increasing the 
likelihood that former members would receive their statutory minimum benefit. There 
may be some selection: the authors understand that the Registrar sent back some of the 
pre-PF117 valuations, presumably those where actuaries had substantially strengthened 
their margins.
4.1.3 In 35 schemes there was no change to the liability basis. This implies 
that either the valuators regarded their previously (supposedly prudent) basis as a best-
estimate basis or had not really bought in to the PF117 method. Although the liability 
basis remained unchanged, in some cases contingency reserves were created and in a 
few cases reserves were released. This resulted in a wide range of change in the overall 
strength of individual valuation bases as can be seen in Table A.1.
4.1.4 In 118 funds actuaries eliminated some of their margins from the 
previous valuation basis and then motivated contingency reserves to roughly replace 
these margins. This is more or less what one would have expected from the rationale 
behind PF117. Although this happened on average, it did not really happen for each 
scheme. If one looks at the scheme-by-scheme strengthening or weakening of the overall 
basis (see Table A.1), one sees that there is a considerable range hidden in the average 
figure.
4.1.5 Against one’s intuitive expectations, 222 schemes explicitly strength-
ened their basis by an average of 12,5% (using up R7,5bn of surplus). This implies that 
the actuaries now considered the previous basis to be substantially weaker than best 
estimate, notwithstanding the fact that the previous valuation basis was deemed to be 
financially sound and therefore a prudent basis at the time. As explained below in the 
discussion of the intervaluation experience, the authors do not consider this to be reason-
able in general. Valuators then motivated for R3,6bn of contingency reserves, further 
strengthening the basis by 6,1%. Again, these average figures hide a considerable range 
of individual figures per scheme (see Table A.1).
4.1.6 Of the 375 valuations signed off after 1 September 2004, 128 held no 
contingency reserves on a best-estimate basis (except in 24 of the 128 cases where a 
surplus expense contingency reserve was held). This was presumably largely because 
of the application of the no-deficit clause. If these were truly best estimates, the authors 
would question the financial soundness of such schemes or would at least recommend, 
as suggested in ¶ 2.4.3.5, that some further research be done on the issue.
4.2 SUMMArY OF THE ANAlYSIS OF SUrPlUS
The analysis of surplus of the 447 valuations is summarised in Table 2. In that 
table funds are first categorised according to whether there was a surplus or a deficit at 
the previous valuation. Here, ‘previous valuation’ refers to the valuation (statutory or 
interim) immediately prior to PFSAA, as reported in the valuation report in terms of 
section 15B. Funds with a surplus at the previous valuation were split into three categories 
depending on whether a surplus, deficit or nil surplus emerged at the valuation in terms 
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of section 15B. Funds with a deficit at the previous valuation were similarly categorised. 
‘Controllable strains’ refers to items that the fund has some control over, namely:
 – pension increases in excess of the funding level;
 – pensioner outsourcing;
 – contribution strains and contribution holidays;
 – transfers to employer surplus accounts in terms of section 15F of the Act; and
 – benefit improvements other than statutory minimum benefits.
‘Improper use of surplus’ refers to the value of improper uses of surplus in terms of 
section 15B(6)(b) of the Act. This figure appears only in 65 of the 447 valuations since 
many of the valuations did not include it, possibly leaving it for the subsequent surplus-
apportionment report. ‘Statutory minimum’ refers to the cost of improving the benefits 
to the statutory minimum level set out in section 14B of the PFSAA. ‘Economic surplus’ 
refers to interest and salary surplus and strains in excess of the valuation assumptions. 
‘Demographic surplus’ covers withdrawal, death in service and retirement surplus or 
strains. ‘Pensioner mortality’ refers to surplus or strains arising from pensioner mortality. 
In some cases the analysis of surplus did not split the experience between the various 
sources of surplus; this is referred to as ‘unallocated experience’. Note that a large part 
of this figure arises from one fund (it was surprising that a fund of this size did not give 
a more detailed analysis of surplus). This figure also includes all amounts described as 
‘miscellaneous’, which in the analysis of surplus is usually an aggregate of a number of 
less significant surplus and strains. ‘Change in basis’ includes all contingency reserves, 
except for the reserve for expenses that might be incurred in a surplus distribution. In 
valuations prior to the valuation in terms of section 15B, it was common practice to place 
an actuarial value on the assets. This effectively created an ‘investment reserve’ (which, 
in some cases, was negative). For the valuation in terms of section 15B, the market value 
of assets was most commonly used, except in only 21 cases. For the purposes of Table 
2, all changes in methods and assumptions are counted as changes in basis. ‘Total basis 
change %’ is the change in basis expressed as a percentage of liabilities prior to the 
change. A positive percentage indicates an overall strengthening of the basis; a negative 
percentage an overall weakening (unlike in Table 1).
4.3 CONTROLLABLE STRAINS
4.3.1 Table 2 shows that the reduction in surplus due to controllable strains 
amounted to a net amount of R9,7bn. These strains are itemised in Table 3, together with 
the number of funds involved, and the surplus component of the net figure is separately 
identified.
4.3.2 The R1 955m allocated to contributions is not entirely under the control 
of the fund. There are two reasons why contributions may reduce the surplus of a fund:
(1) the employer might under-contribute; or
(2)  contributions might be lower than expected, if salary increases are lower than 
expected.
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The second reason is not controllable by the fund, but its effect tends to be small. Part 
of the total of R381m from improper use of surplus (see Table 2) is a recoupment of 
contribution holidays from the employer as required by section 15B(6)(b) of the PFSAA. 
This has not been netted off the figures shown, largely because the figure for improper 
use did often not appear in the valuation report but only possibly in a subsequent report 
on surplus apportionment.
Table 2. Summary of the analysis of surplus (R millions)
Previous valuation: surplus deficit
total
Section 15B valuation: surplus nil deficit surplus nil deficit
Number of funds 197 77 91 6 10 66 447
Section 15b reserves 41 397 61 455 43 866 567 1 088 12 762 161 
133
Analysis of surplus
Previous surplus 8 637 5 398 2 049 –39 –33 –746 15 266
Interest on surplus 2 844 2 200 624 –11 –9 –276 5 372
Controllable strains –2 798 –5 097 –2 592 –8 54 699 –9 742
Improper use of surplus 148 192 29 0 11 1 381
Statutory minimum –100 –114 –211 –1 –10 –214 –650
Economic surplus 2 872 –33 –2 134 144 76 –583 342
Demographic surplus 392 –283 192 4 15 –5 315
Pensioner mortality –76 244 –26 0 –5 –2 135
Unallocated experience 3 047 838 –422 121 4 –7 3 581
Change in basis –6 023 –3 309 –517 –2 –98 21 –9 928
Surplus expense reserves –204 –36 –3 –24 –5 0 –272
Distributable surplus 8 739 0 –3 011 184 0 –1 112 4 800
Total basis change % 17,0% 5,7% 1,2% 0,4% 9,9% –0,2% 6,6%
Table 3. Controllable strains (R millions)
Strain Surplus Total
amount funds amount funds amount funds
Contributions –2 523 231 568 98 –1 955 329
Employer surplus accounts –1 033 5 249 3 –784 8
Pension increases –6 195 154 898 112 –5 297 266
Pensioner outsourcing –162 10 17 2 –145 12
Benefit improvements –1 994 71 434 8 –1 560 79
Total –11 907 2 166 –9 741
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4.3.3 R249m was released from existing employer reserve accounts, and 
R1 033m was allocated to employer surplus accounts. (This latter figure was generated 
largely by one fund.) This allocation was permitted in terms of section 15F of the PFSAA 
as follows:
(1)  On or after the commencement date [7 December 2001], the board may apply to 
transfer all or some of the credit balance in an existing reserve account as defined in 
the rules to the employer surplus account.
(2)  The registrar may approve such transfer if he or she is satisfied that the allocation of 
actuarial surplus was negotiated between the stakeholders in a manner consistent with 
the principles underlying Sections 15B and 15C.
(3)  Any remaining portion of the credit balance in an existing reserve account shall be 
treated as actuarial surplus to be distributed in terms of Section 15B.
The Registrar therefore has the responsibility to ensure that the principles of section 
15B of the PFSAA are complied with before any transfer from an existing employer 
reserve account to an employer surplus account may be authorised. One of the aims of 
the PFSAA set out in section 15B(5)(a) is that former members should, if possible, have 
their benefits topped up to the statutory minimum level.
4.3.4 Pension increases of R5 297m were granted, again a net figure comprising:
 – 112 funds that gave pension increases lower than the increases implicit in the funding 
basis, generating surplus of R898m; and
 – 154 funds that gave pension increases higher than the increases implicit in the funding 
basis, generating strains of R6 195m.
4.3.5 Benefit improvements to the value of R1 560m were granted during the 
intervaluation period. This comprised:
 – eight funds that reduced the accrued benefits of members, generating surplus of 
R434m; and
 – 71 funds that granted benefit improvements, generating strains of R1 994m. At least 
three of the benefit improvements were effective after the promulgation of the PFSAA.
Without further information, it is difficult to reconcile the surplus of R434m referred 
to here with section 37A of the Act, which provides that no accrued benefit is capable 
of being reduced, except as permitted by the Act, the Income Tax Act, 196210 and the 
Maintenance Act, 1998.11
4.3.6 Although not significant, outsourcing of pensioners to life-assurance 
companies resulted in a strain of R145m.
4.3.7 Total controllable strains amount to R11,9bn. These are significant 
additional liabilities, which reduced the surplus available to top up the benefits of former 
members to the statutory minimum benefit. The extent to which this motivated these 
10 Act no. 58 of 1962 as amended
11 Act no. 99 of 1998 as amended
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pre-PFSAA surplus allocations is not a matter of public record, but it is highly probably 
that in the uncertainty of the run-up to the PFSAA, many funds took the opportunity to 
allocate surplus to active members, pensioners and employers via these mechanisms.
4.4 EXPECTATIONS OF SURPLUS
4.4.1 In 2006 ASSA issued a press release,12 which was a pre-emptive attempt 
to manage the public’s expectations of surplus likely to be distributed under PFSAA. It is 
instructive to examine the press release in the light of the experience revealed in Table 2.
4.4.2 ASSA points to the popular expectation of R60bn to R80bn and gives 
various reasons why the figure is likely to be much less in practice (the authors’ comments 
are given in brackets):
 – The original figure of R80bn was an over-estimate anyway. (The authors agree, see 
section 6.)
 – Poor investment performance in years 2001–2003 resulted in “relatively less assets 
than they had in the late 1990s.” (Relative to the conservative actuarial assumptions 
used at the previous valuation, the 447 funds analysed emerged with an investment 
surplus of R908m during the intervaluation period.)
 – The fall in long gilt yields from 12,73% to 9,21% increased the value placed on 
liabilities and the investment performance did not compensate for this. (There was 
a corresponding fall in inflation from 4,5% to 0,4%, so real rates in fact increased 
slightly over the same period. The fall in inflation was not mentioned in the ASSA 
press release. For funds with the required detail (383 out of the 447 in Table 2), the 
above sources generated surplus of R342m (R908m surplus from investment returns 
and R566m salary strain). There was also unallocated surplus of R3 581m, which 
probably indicates a positive figure overall.)
 – The cost of introducing minimum benefits had to be accounted for. (Agreed, Table 2 
shows a figure of R650m.)
 – ASSA states that people are living longer “overseas” and that this improvement is a 
more recent phenomenon in South Africa. Pensioner mortality assumptions would 
thus have to be increased, resulting in liability increases of up to 15%. (This topic is 
discussed in section 4.5. Interestingly, for the 447 funds with relevant detail analysed 
in Table 2, pensioner mortality actually generated surplus of R135m.)
 – DB funds were largely closed to new entrants, so extra care was needed to ensure 
adequate funding. (This seemed to imply that the basis or the solvency reserves 
needed to be strengthened but funds should already have been using bases prudent 
enough to handle these circumstances.)
 – The cost of the surplus exercise had to be accounted for. (Agreed, this amounted to 
R263m in Table 2.)
 – Finally, taking all factors into account and general economic and demographic 
conditions, a reduction in surplus was expected. (As it turned out the overall experience 
of the funds in the sample generated a fairly healthy surplus).
12 ASSA. Retirement Fund Surplus: March 2006 deadline looms, press release, 2006
SAAJ 12 (2012)
114 | DID THE PENSION FUNDS SECOND AMENDMENT ACT ACHIEVE ITS AIMS?
4.4.3 So the experience of the funds in the sample, to the extent that it is repre-
sentative of the whole situation, has not generally supported the ASSA press release. For 
those items that are supported by Table 2, the quanta involved do not make them major 
contributors to the drop in surplus. ASSA alludes to changes in assumption for the discount 
rate and pensioner mortality. In general, the issue of a change in basis is probably most 
significant. This has been quantified in Table 2 and is further discussed in section 4.5.
4.5 CHANGES IN BASIS
4.5.1 PENSION INCrEASES
4.5.1.1 A particular challenge at the valuation in terms of section 15B was the 
allowance for pension increases. As background, there are two elements to the statutory 
minimum pension increases introduced by the PFSAA:
(1)  every fund should have a pension increase policy that aims to increase 
pensions by a percentage of inflation at least once a year; and
(2)  every three years there should be a catch-up exercise that aims to increase 
pensions to a level equal to the initial pension fully adjusted for inflation.
The percentage referred to in element (1) is not specified in the PFSAA. Theoretically it 
could be fairly modest. The catch-up exercise referred to in (2) is subject to there being 
sufficient assets in the notional pensioner account. This account is essentially the liability 
at retirement less any commutation less pension payments and expenses all rolled up 
with fund interest. The capacity of the notional pensioner account to contribute to the 
periodic 100% catch-up to the consumer price index would depend on the experience 
of the scheme and the strength of the liability valuation basis at the date of retirement. 
The initial 100% catch-up under element (2) above is not an invitation to strengthen 
the liability basis to fund for pension increases of 100% of inflation. In terms of section 
15B(5)(b) of the PFSAA, the initial 100% inflation catch-up on surplus apportionment 
date was further limited to rank equally with the former member top-up to the statutory 
minimum benefit as a priority call on any surplus in terms of section 15B. If there were to 
be insufficient surplus in terms of section 15B, both these allocations would be adjusted 
pro rata downwards.
4.5.1.2 Section 6.4 of PGN205, the professional guidance issued by ASSA on 
the PFSAA states that:
Where the establishment of the pension increase policy, including any limitation on 
affordability, results in a discount rate used to value the pensioner liabilities which is lower 
than the rate used in the previous valuation, and such change cannot be justified to the 
Registrar, the valuator should advise the Board that the establishment of the policy may 
be viewed as a benefit improvement which may adversely affect the ability of the fund to 
enhance benefits for former members …
PGN205 then reinforces this point by suggesting that in such a case the surplus valuation 
should be brought forward to the date of the benefit improvement, presumably to ensure 
that the rights of former members and pensioners are not compromised.
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4.5.1.3 The authors agree that the implementation of a pension increase policy of 
this nature (i.e. in excess of that funded for in the previous valuation basis) is effectively 
a benefit improvement. Such an increase in the provision for pension increases will 
prompt a reduction in the post-retirement interest rate and this effectively allocates 
surplus to active members because of the resultant increase in active member liabilities. 
To preserve the spirit of the PFSAA, the proper action in such a situation would seem to 
be to pay for the cost of funding this higher pension increase policy via a cash injection 
to the fund, so as not to diminish the surplus available for the initial pension inflation 
catch-up exercise and for topping up former member benefits to the statutory minimum. 
It is not clear that this was widely adopted.
4.5.1.4 In most cases it was not possible to tell whether or not a benefit 
improvement was being implemented, and so the changes in the post-retirement interest 
rate were taken as genuine changes in basis introduced by the actuary, and not a benefit 
improvement as contemplated in PGN205. Consequently, changes in the post-retirement 
interest rate are counted as a change in basis for the purposes of this analysis.
4.5.2 PENSIONEr MOrTAlITY
4.5.2.1 The profit of R135m generated in the intervaluation period from pen-
sioner mortality seems to indicate that the assumptions used at the previous valuation 
were adequate. However, mortality strains are slow to emerge and were usually not quan-
tified. Only 75 funds of the 447 funds reported a pensioner mortality item; 31 of them 
reported a surplus from this source. Other pensioner mortality strains may have been too 
small to quantify and will have been counted under the miscellaneous item. In its press 
release,13 ASSA notes that, with regard to improving pensioner mortality, “this trend has 
been well-documented overseas for some time” and then seems to extrapolate to “it is a 
more recent phenomenon here in South Africa.” The authors suggest that the local evi-
dence is far from decisive.
4.5.2.2 In analysing South African annuitant data Dorrington & Tootla (2007) 
note that:
Comparison of population mortality rates produced by Dorrington, Moultrie & Timæus 
(2004) with the South African Life Tables 1984–86 (Central Statistical Service, 1987) 
and those produced by Dorrington (1998) suggest that there has been little decrease in 
population mortality of those over 65 between 1984–86 and 1996–2001 (even within the 
population groups).
They also recommend that if one has to project future improvements in mortality, one 
should use the UK rule of thumb of reducing by one year of age for every 20 years pro-
jected, because there are “too few data from which to decide a trend.” Further reasoning 
behind this recommendation is not given.
4.5.2.3 When commenting on a proposal to change the state pension age in the 
13 ASSA, supra
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UK, the Actuarial Profession (2006)14 sets out the difficulties with the projection of life 
expectancy. With regard to the projection of future pensioner mortality rates it makes the 
point that “This is an almost impossible task as the level of uncertainty is too great.”
4.5.2.4 Irrespective of new diseases and medical improvements in the future, 
South African pensioners may experience a higher incidence of disease and risk than over-
seas pensioners. South Africa is a relatively violent society; the frequency of fatal road ac-
cidents is higher than overseas and diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS are more 
prevalent. Although AIDS will have a relatively small effect at older ages, the effect is not 
nil. According to the ASSA AIDS model, in 2025, AIDS will account for 5,75% of deaths 
over age 60 and 2,92% of deaths over age 65. Further details are set out in Appendix B.
4.5.2.5 The extent to which speculation around future improvements in 
pensioner mortality should be allowed for in the valuation assumptions is, of course, 
a matter of professional opinion. One would assume that valuators would already have 
made allowance for such improvements in their previous assumptions. There appears to 
be nothing significant in the experience to indicate an abrupt improvement in pensioner 
mortality. Nevertheless, it can be said that valuators did on the whole act decisively (if 
not abruptly) in the matter of pensioner mortality.
4.5.2.6 Of the 286 funds where we (fairly readily) have the pensioner mortality 
assumptions for both the previous and the best-estimate valuations, only 69 left their 
pensioner-mortality assumptions unchanged. Almost without exception the assumptions 
at both valuations were based on standard overseas tables. No assumptions in the 
previous mortality basis made any explicit allowance for continuous future improvement 
other than might have been implicit in the standard table. For the best-estimate valuation 
107 of the 286 funds introduced explicit allowance for future improvement ranging from 
0,5% to 1% a year. Many of the assumptions in the previous valuation were based on 
very old tables and one assumes that valuators were happy to leave these unchanged for 
many years. The PFSAA seems to have provoked the body of valuators into an abrupt 
shift in the pensioner mortality assumption.
4.5.2.7 It is not clear to the authors that this quantum of shift was justified and, 
even if it were justified, it is unfortunate that the shift occurred just when it would have 
a significant negative effect on the distribution of surplus to former members.
4.5.2.8 A possible explanation is that valuators were previously happy to leave 
outmoded mortality assumptions in place because they were implicitly allowing for 
future mortality improvement via a reduction in the discount rate. PF117 then required a 
best estimate for each assumption separately. If this were the case, we should expect the 
changing of mortality assumptions to be accompanied by a relaxing of the discount rate, 
i.e. the overall strength of the basis would remain much the same. This is not supported 
by the first column of 197 funds in Table 2.
14 The Actuarial Profession. The response of the actuarial profession to the second report of the 
Pensions Commission: a new settlement for the twenty-first century. Paper 1: Commentary on 
the use of life expectancy data in the Pensions Commission Report, Submission as a response 
to the Pensions Commission 2nd Report, 2006
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4.5.3 THE rEAl rATE OF rETUrN
4.5.3.1 Actuaries have traditionally pointed out that, while the absolute levels 
of investment returns and salary inflation are quite variable over time, the difference or 
‘gap’ is far more stable. On these grounds actuaries have been reluctant to change the gap 
in their assumptions.
4.5.3.2 As ASSA pointed out in its press release, long-bond yields fell, indicating 
the market view that long-term inflation had been brought under control; a positive 
development for DB funds where the liabilities are linked to inflation.
4.5.3.3 The existing bases produced an economic surplus of R342m.
4.5.3.4 There therefore seems little justification for narrowing the gap.
4.5.4 bASIS INFlUENCED bY SUrPlUS
Professional guidance15 states that actuaries should be consistent with their 
reasoning between funds, notwithstanding that different funds could have different bases. 
The analysis of surplus (see Table 2) shows that the existence of a surplus influenced 
actuaries considerably when changing the assumptions for the valuation in terms of 
section 15B. The existence of surplus or deficit has not traditionally been a determining 
factor in the setting of actuarial assumptions.
4.5.5 ExPErIENCE
4.5.5.1 According to conventional actuarial practice as encapsulated in the 
actuarial control cycle, the actuary will review the experience in the fund since the 
previous valuation. If the experience is credible, she/he will make changes to the valuation 
assumptions should the experience indicate deficiencies or excessive prudence. If the 
experience is not credible, the actuary will base any changes on the general experience 
of similar schemes. In terms of the actuarial control cycle, the monitoring of experience 
therefore plays an important role in the setting of assumptions. Table 4 summarises the 
experience since the previous valuation. Strains that the trustees of the funds had control 
over have been excluded, as these strains are likely to be once-off strains and are therefore 
not relevant to the setting of actuarial assumptions for the future. In Table 4 ‘experience’ 
combines the entries for economic surplus, demographic surplus, pensioner mortality 
and unallocated experience in Table 2. ‘Experience % of liabilities’ is the surplus arising 
from experience expressed as a percentage of the liability at the valuation in terms of 
section 15B before the change in basis. ‘Basis change % of liabilities’ is the overall 
change in basis expressed as a percentage of liabilities prior to the change. A positive 
percentage indicates an increase in reserves, a negative percentage a decrease.
4.5.5.2 The results in Table 4 are inexplicable in terms of the actuarial control 
cycle. In categories in which the actuarial basis was strong enough to generate surplus, 
actuaries tended to strengthen the basis, and where the basis generated deficits, actuaries 
were content to leave their assumptions more or less unchanged. Normally the principles 
underlying the actuarial control cycle would require the actuary to consider strengthening 
15 ASSA. PGN205: Pension Funds Second Amendment Act, 2001, 2004
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the basis if it were shown to be inadequate by the experience. Bases that generated 
surplus could be left unchanged or weakened if excessively strong.
4.5.5.3 The strengthening of the basis by an average of 16,1% over 194 funds 
looks particularly unusual. In a traditional valuation, a general increase of this magnitude 
would indicate a major structural change in the economy or in the demographics of the 
fund. Historically, such a change would usually have been phased in over a number of 
valuations. As discussed in previous sections, it is felt that claims for such a structural 
change cannot be justified.
Table 4. Change of basis relative to experience (R millions)
Experience generated Surplus Strain Total
Number of funds 194 253 447
Liability 74 558 86 576 116 133
Experience 11 376 –7 002 4 374
Change in basis –10 317 388 9 929
Experience: % of liability 17,1% –8,1% 2,9%
Basis change: % of liability 16,1% –0,5% 6,6%
4.5.5.4 Normally employers would not easily accept such large cost increases. 
The decoupling of reserving basis from funding basis meant, however, that the effect of 
these basis changes did not fully flow through to future-service costs.
4.5.6 PrOFESSIONAl GUIDANCE
Section 2.2 of PGN20516 states that:
In determining appropriate valuation methods and assumptions and in recommending the 
types and amounts of contingency reserves to be held at the surplus apportionment date, 
a valuator will not necessarily reach the same conclusions for different funds. This is 
a consequence of the varied characteristics of retirement funds as well as the different 
apportionment dates and past practices on these funds. It is especially important, however, 
that the reasons given to support the valuator’s conclusions are consistent between funds.
The results in Table 4 and Table A.1 call into question the consistency of the valuators’ 
reasoning between funds. Whilst the point is not within the scope of this study, the 
authors noted that many valuation reports quoted PF117 verbatim. It is therefore possible 
that many valuators took the opportunity to increase reserves to the maximum allowed 
by PF117, probably on the understanding that any basis falling within the limits of PF117 
was automatically reasonable. As discussed in section 2.5, the Board of Appeal, however, 
stressed the importance of other factors such as the financial history of the fund. One of 
the authors was initially embarrassed to find that one of his valuations had strengthened 
16 ASSA, supra
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by over 40% on the previous basis. Investigation showed, however, that this was a very 
unusual fund because of the degree of litigation involved with a consequent increase in 
expense and legal contingency reserves. It seems unlikely that so many of the funds with 
excessive strengthening would have similarly unusual circumstances.
4.5.7 POST-vAlUATION ExPErIENCE
4.5.7.1 Historically, actuaries took into account experience that occurred after 
the valuation date but before the valuation report was signed. This approach is entirely 
reasonable and is endorsed by the Board of Appeal.17
4.5.7.2 In the processing of the valuations in terms of section 15B there were 
unusually long delays. One of the reasons for this was that PF117 was issued only in 
2004, towards the end of the three-year cycle of valuations arising after 7 December 
2001. The period from 2005 to 2007, in which many of the valuation reports in terms 
of section 15B in the sample were issued, was a period of high real returns and it was 
apparent that the next valuation after the valuation in terms of section 15B would 
generally reveal considerable surplus, to which, at that stage, former members would no 
longer have a right. This was a further argument against the strengthening of valuation 
assumptions at the valuation in terms of section 15B. The results in Table 4 indicate, 
however, that this post-valuation experience was not generally taken into account by 
actuaries. One valuator did take the post-valuation experience into account for several 
schemes by placing a higher value on the assets than market value for the purpose 
of financial soundness. This was not carried through to the calculation of surplus for 
distribution however, which was based on market value. This was perhaps a questionable 
application of PF117 but, to be fair, few actuaries would be brave enough to distribute 
assets that the fund did not actually physically have at valuation date.
4.5.8 FUNDING FOr STATUTOrY MINIMUM bENEFITS
4.5.8.1 It has been suggested that the introduction of the statutory minimum 
benefit on withdrawal should result in a change to the valuation assumptions. The 
argument seems to be that the ‘greater security’ enjoyed by the statutory minimum 
benefits warrant discounting at a lower rate (corporate AA rates are suggested).
4.5.8.2 The extent to which the statutory minimum benefit exceeds the previous 
rule-based withdrawal benefit creates an additional liability. The valuator quantifies the 
value of this liability and shows it as an analysis-of-surplus item.
4.5.8.3 Section 14 A(1)(b) of the PFSAA allows the statutory minimum benefit 
to be reduced pro rata if there are insufficient assets in the case of a liquidation. This 
belies the ‘greater security’ argument and there seems to be no justification for changing 
the valuation basis on account of the introduction of the statutory minimum benefits over 
and above the adjustment set out in ¶4.5.8.2 above. In particular, the introduction of the 
statutory basis for minimum benefits should not result in a change to the real discount 
rate used in the valuation basis.
17 supra
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5. COMMUNICATION
5.1 Communication is considered a core professional competency. The authors find 
some of the communication practices around the surplus distribution to be questionable 
and it is worth recording some instances.
5.2 Some valuators effectively claimed that a best-estimate valuation basis with no 
margins for prudence and no contingency reserves was financially sound. The authors 
question whether the trustees were fully informed of the levels of risk associated with 
such a claim.
5.3 Many best-estimate liability valuations on the other hand were unchanged or 
strengthened since the previous valuation and so probably contained implicit margins 
(see Table 1). The question arises how these were represented to trustees. If they were 
represented as having no margins for prudence, the trustees would have felt free, indeed 
obliged, to further strengthen reserves. This suggests good faith on the part of the trustees, 
but possibly not on the part of the actuary.
5.4 ASSA has claimed in a publication intended to be distributed free of charge as 
a service to the public, that one of the main reasons for the reduction in surplus is the 
creation of contingency reserves.18 As discussed in ¶2.3.6, most explicit contingencies 
should already have been identified and reserved for in the previous valuation, so it is 
difficult to understand how the creation of contingency reserves could be a major reason 
for the reduction in surplus.
5.5 ASSA’s communications with the press are discussed in ¶2.4.3.5 and section 
4.4. From these discussions, it can be questioned whether these could be considered 
examples of good communication.
6. RECONCILING TO THE R80BN ESTIMATE
6.1 The original estimate of overall surplus was R80bn. Over ten years after the 
promulgation of the PFSAA only R47,6bn surplus had been distributed and it seems 
unlikely that the ultimate surplus distribution will reach the R80bn mark.
6.2 According to Mabotja19 the estimate of R80bn surplus was made by the Chief 
Actuary as follows: allowing for growth in assets and additional contributions, the R352bn 
assets reported in the Registrar’s annual report at the end of 1996 will have grown to at 
least R400bn by 1998. Surplus of 20% of assets was assumed, giving an estimated surplus 
of R80bn. This estimate implicitly assumes that DC funds will also have a surplus of 20%.
18 ASSA ’ndaba No. 1, 2004
19 Mabotja, supra
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6.3 Of the funds included in the estimate referred to by Mabotja, many may have 
terminated, many DB funds converted to DC, distributing surplus in the process, and 
many funds would have distributed surplus via benefit improvements, pension increases 
and contribution holidays. All of this would have happened before the promulgation of 
the PFSAA. In the sample of 447 funds the amount of surplus used in such controllable 
strains just before the PFSAA was quantified at R11,9bn (Table 3).
6.4 Based on available data in the sample, the surplus at the valuation prior to the 
promulgation of the PFSAA amounted to approximately 13% of the actuarial value of 
assets. This would indicate that the estimate of 20% surplus is possibly an overestimate, 
at least for DB funds. It is not clear whether this 13% factor can be applied to DC funds, 
or to the DB funds for which data are not available.
6.5 For the 447 DB schemes in the sample the surplus at the valuation preceding the 
valuation in terms of section 15B, accumulated with interest to the valuation in terms 
of section 15B, amounted to R20,6bn. There was additional surplus of R4,4bn resulting 
from experience. The surplus actually revealed at valuations in terms of section 15B 
amounted to R4,8bn. The main reasons for this reduction in surplus were the controllable 
strains of R9,7bn and R10bn due to changes in actuarial basis.
6.6 Whilst we might surmise that the balance of the DB funds follow a pattern 
similar to the above, the estimation of the amount of surplus in the DC funds presents 
particular challenges, not least because data may not be in the public domain for 
valuation-exempt funds. Furthermore it is not immediately clear what percentage of 
the combined DC assets would reasonably approximate the surplus in these funds. The 
authors conclude that it will not be possible to produce a detailed reconciliation to the 
figure of R80bn.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
7.1 A sample of 447 surplus valuation reports for South African DB funds was 
examined. This probably constitutes at least 40% to 50% of the universe of such reports. 
There may be some bias in the sample as most of the reports were completed earlier than 
average and viable analysis-of-surplus information was available for these funds. It is not 
clear, though, what the effect of such bias, if any, might be. In general the authors consider 
that the sample is representative of the universe of such funds, although further research 
may be needed to establish to what extent the results obtained can be extrapolated.
7.2 During the run-up to the PFSAA, R11,9bn of surplus was distributed from the 
447 funds in the sample by way of benefit improvements, pension increases in excess of 
the funded rate of increase, the setting-up of employer surplus accounts and contribution 
holidays. It is probable that these changes were partly motivated by the impending 
constraints of the PFSAA. One may speculate that this figure would be considerably 
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increased if one extrapolated to all such funds and included those DB funds that converted 
to DC in this prior period, distributing surplus in the process.
7.3 Strengthening of the valuation basis in the sample used up a net R10bn of surplus. 
If we consider only those funds where the basis was strengthened, this figure increases 
to R13bn. This strengthening was not required nor encouraged by the legislation and it 
was not, in general, supported by the experience of the funds. Indeed, there seems, in 
general, to be a perverse relationship between the experience of the funds and the change 
of bases. In particular, where the experience generated ample surpluses, indicating that 
the previous basis was sufficiently prudent, the basis was often further strengthened (an 
average of 16,1%).
7.4 The effects set out in ¶¶7.2 and 7.3 have been to reduce the surplus available to top 
up former member and pensioner benefits to the statutory minimum and are thus contrary 
to the spirit of the PFSAA. Former members are particularly vulnerable as their statutory 
right to surplus expires following the surplus distribution in terms of section 15B. In 
terms of professional standards the “Actuarial Profession has an obligation to serve the 
public interest.”20 It is questionable whether this reduction of surplus distribution to 
former members is in the public interest.
7.5 There are strong indications that the former members have been adversely 
affected by the unequal treatment in the method of calculation of their minimum benefits 
in comparison to active members. Further research will be needed to both confirm and 
quantify this. As mentioned in ¶2.7.5 it may also be fruitful to research the effect of the 
margins implicit in the prescription of the statutory minimum benefit.
7.6 Some of the methodologies of PF117 are called into question. In particular, the 
no-deficit clause seems to have no actuarial justification at all, but leads to a number of 
problems. In the first place it decouples the funding basis from the reserving basis. At one 
end of the spectrum, one can have a scheme both funded and reserved on a best-estimate 
basis. In such a case there is a 50% risk that assets will be insufficient for accrued 
benefits and a 50% risk that the contribution rate will be insufficient to fund for future 
benefits. Before this is adopted as an acceptable method, it is essential that research be 
done, perhaps using stochastic modelling, to determine the levels of risk inherent in this 
approach. At the other end of the spectrum, a fund may be strongly reserved (to the full 
extent allowed by PF117), but still only be funding on a best-estimate basis. Normally 
an employer would resist increases in cost if a strengthened basis is proposed and this 
forms a natural check on any excessive strengthening of the basis. This check has now 
been removed because on the best-estimate funding basis the employer may even be 
contributing less than before whilst the increasing of the reserves served to deny surplus 
to the former members. For this reason, the no-deficit clause has probably encouraged 
20 Faculty and Institute of Actuaries, 1999, supra
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the strengthening of bases noted in ¶7.3 above. These problems with the no-deficit clause 
were exacerbated by the diminished use of investment reserves, particularly as these 
could be reclassified as part of the solvency reserve (which is subject to the no-deficit 
clause).
7.7 Whilst outside the scope of the investigation, three questionable practices were 
noted that warrant further research:
 – the reduction of accrued benefits;
 – benefit improvements funded from surplus after the promulgation of the PFSAA but 
before the allocation of surplus in terms of section 15B of the PFSAA; and
 – the possible adoption of pension increase policies in excess of the allowance in the 
funding basis after the promulgation of the PFSAA but before the allocation of surplus 
in terms of section 15B of the PFSAA.
7.8 Given the various difficulties with the surplus process outlined in this paper, one 
must ask whether the profession has communicated with trustees, the public and former 
members with the thoroughness and transparency that its professional standards would 
require.
7.9 The actuarial profession’s response to the PFSAA may represent something of a 
credibility crisis for the profession. Andrew (2004) perhaps had some insight into this 
possibility:
In the conversion process, the reputation of the actuarial profession in South Africa has 
suffered damage. Trade-union representatives do not trust the actuary to treat members 
fairly; on the contrary, they expect the actuary to act in concert with the employer.
 The actuarial profession will have to work hard to overcome these negative expectations. 
The Pension Funds Second Amendment Act, 2001, will produce a considerable volume of 
actuarial work over the next few years. The legislation has given the profession a second 
chance. It must do it right this time.
 The profession must ensure that the surplus apportionment is conducted within the spirit 
of the Act as well as within the guidelines drawn up by ASSA.
 Actuaries must now be seen to be impartial, to be managing the conflicts of interest, and 
to be communicating better.
It is perhaps fair to say that the true character of a profession is revealed in its response 
to challenging situations.
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APPENDIX A
COMPARISONS OF VALUATION BASES AND STATUTORY MINIMUM 
BENEFITS
Table A.1 shows the overall strengthening or weakening of the surplus valuation basis 
compared with that of the previous valuation. The different columns represent the same 
categories as those set out in Table 1. In the column ‘% strengthening of overall basis’ 
a negative percentage indicates a weaker basis. In the column headed ‘unchanged’ 
asterisks indicate that the liability basis was unchanged or stronger but the release of 
contingency reserves held at the previous valuation (such data reserves) led to an overall 
weakening of the basis.





1/9/2004 unchanged weaker stronger Total
–40% to –50% 1* 1  2
–30% to –40%  1  1
–20% to –30% 1  1  2
–10% to –20% 1 1* 18  20
0% to –10% 37 14* 42 4* 97
Sub-total 39 16 63 4 122
0% to 10% 18 14 33 92 157
10% to 20% 8 4 18 68 98
20% to 30% 5 1 2 36 44
30% to 40%   1 14 15
40% to 50% 1   5 6
50% to 60%   1 2 3
60% to 70% 1   1 2
Sub-total 33 19 55 218 325
Total 72 35 118 222 447
Table A.2 sets out a comparison of the statutory minimum benefits of active and former 
members. The calculations are based on an accrued pension of R1000 a year. The actuary 
places a value of, say, 11 on the pension at normal retirement date, which is taken as 
31 December 2004. To simplify the calculation, this is also taken as the date of the 
surplus apportionment. The calculation of the benefit of the former member uses the 
proxy returns provided by the FSB for the period between date of exit and the surplus 
apportionment date.
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   Table A.2. Comparison of statutory benefits of active and former members
Date of exit FSB Returns Index CPI ILG – 0.95% t (1+C)t 1000 11 (1+d) t Former Members Active Members Diff
31/12/2001 4,285.21 107.2 4.05% 3.000 1.2014 1,201 13,215 1.4795 8,932 9,765 9.33%
31/01/2002 4,146.67 109.0 3.79% 2.917 1.1806 1,181 12,986 1.5290 8,493 9,869 16.20%
28/02/2002 4,206.20 110.2 3.54% 2.833 1.1667 1,167 12,834 1.5073 8,514 9,967 17.07%
31/03/2002 4,261.53 111.3 3.43% 2.750 1.1542 1,154 12,697 1.4878 8,534 10,026 17.48%
30/04/2002 4,375.91 113.1 3.18% 2.667 1.1349 1,135 12,484 1.4489 8,617 10,119 17.44%
31/05/2002 4,408.88 113.9 3.15% 2.583 1.1260 1,126 12,386 1.4380 8,613 10,153 17.88%
30/06/2002 4,337.33 114.7 3.13% 2.500 1.1172 1,117 12,290 1.4618 8,407 10,184 21.13%
31/07/2002 4,095.59 116.3 3.13% 2.417 1.1010 1,101 12,111 1.5480 7,823 10,210 30.52%
31/08/2002 4,220.78 116.9 3.07% 2.333 1.0944 1,094 12,038 1.5021 8,014 10,251 27.90%
30/09/2002 4,189.34 118.1 2.78% 2.250 1.0824 1,082 11,906 1.5134 7,867 10,342 31.45%
31/10/2002 4,210.30 119.9 2.87% 2.167 1.0653 1,065 11,718 1.5059 7,781 10,346 32.96%
30/11/2002 4,322.28 120.3 3.04% 2.083 1.0608 1,061 11,669 1.4669 7,955 10,335 29.91%
31/12/2002 4,221.67 120.5 3.03% 2.000 1.0582 1,058 11,640 1.5018 7,751 10,363 33.70%
31/01/2003 4,152.39 121.6 3.03% 1.917 1.0478 1,048 11,525 1.5269 7,548 10,388 37.62%
28/02/2003 4,021.43 121.5 3.00% 1.833 1.0477 1,048 11,525 1.5766 7,310 10,420 42.54%
31/03/2003 3,838.96 122.7 2.99% 1.750 1.0366 1,037 11,403 1.6515 6,905 10,447 51.31%
30/04/2003 3,839.63 123.1 2.98% 1.667 1.0324 1,032 11,357 1.6512 6,878 10,475 52.30%
31/05/2003 4,224.94 122.8 2.98% 1.583 1.0341 1,034 11,375 1.5007 7,580 10,500 38.53%
30/06/2003 4,228.68 122.4 3.03% 1.500 1.0366 1,037 11,403 1.4993 7,605 10,518 38.31%
31/07/2003 4,371.09 122.4 3.05% 1.417 1.0357 1,036 11,393 1.4505 7,855 10,542 34.21%
31/08/2003 4,468.45 122.9 3.02% 1.333 1.0307 1,031 11,337 1.4189 7,990 10,572 32.31%
30/09/2003 4,433.38 122.5 3.02% 1.250 1.0332 1,033 11,365 1.4301 7,947 10,598 33.36%
31/10/2003 4,702.51 121.7 3.01% 1.167 1.0391 1,039 11,430 1.3483 8,478 10,626 25.34%
30/11/2003 4,758.08 120.8 3.00% 1.083 1.0460 1,046 11,506 1.3325 8,635 10,653 23.38%
31/12/2003 4,999.68 120.9 3.01% 1.000 1.0443 1,044 11,487 1.2681 9,058 10,679 17.89%
31/01/2004 5,164.93 121.8 3.00% 0.917 1.0357 1,036 11,392 1.2275 9,281 10,706 15.36%
29/02/2004 5,144.88 122.4 3.00% 0.833 1.0297 1,030 11,327 1.2323 9,192 10,732 16.76%
31/03/2004 5,157.81 123.2 2.94% 0.750 1.0222 1,022 11,244 1.2292 9,147 10,764 17.67%
30/04/2004 5,164.73 123.4 2.82% 0.667 1.0197 1,020 11,217 1.2276 9,137 10,798 18.17%
31/05/2004 5,140.24 123.5 2.83% 0.583 1.0180 1,018 11,198 1.2334 9,079 10,822 19.20%
30/06/2004 5,102.91 123.9 2.88% 0.500 1.0139 1,014 11,153 1.2425 8,977 10,845 20.81%
31/07/2004 5,153.88 124.3 2.88% 0.417 1.0098 1,010 11,108 1.2302 9,030 10,871 20.39%
31/08/2004 5,465.07 124.1 2.82% 0.333 1.0106 1,011 11,117 1.1601 9,582 10,899 13.74%
30/09/2004 5,694.62 124.1 2.82% 0.250 1.0098 1,010 11,107 1.1134 9,976 10,924 9.50%
31/10/2004 5,817.75 124.6 2.82% 0.167 1.0049 1,005 11,054 1.0898 10,143 10,949 7.95%
30/11/2004 6,163.35 125.3 2.82% 0.083 0.9984 998 10,983 1.0287 10,676 10,975 2.79%
31/12/2004 6,340.16 125.0 2.81%
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APPENDIX B
AIDS MORTALITY
Table B.1 shows the number of deaths, by AIDS and by other causes, during the year 
starting 1 July 2025 for ages 60 and over according to the ASSA AIDS model. The table 
shows that, on this basis, AIDS will account for 5,75% of deaths over age 60 and 2,92% 
of deaths over age 65.
Table B.1 Proportion of deaths from AIDS over the year starting 1 July 2025
Age Male + Female
ALL AIDS OTHER % AIDS
60 9972 2506 7465 25,13%
61 9731 2043 7688 20,99%
62 9763 1818 7945 18,62%
63 9823 1597 8226 16,26%
64 9895 1391 8504 14,06%
65 9983 1203 8780 12,05%
66 10041 1030 9011 10,26%
67 10085 873 9212 8,65%
68 10098 733 9366 7,26%
69 10654 608 10046 5,71%
70 11099 498 10600 4,49%
71 10898 405 10492 3,72%
72 10687 327 10359 3,06%
73 10463 263 10200 2,51%
74 10528 209 10320 1,98%
75 10488 164 10325 1,56%
76 10037 126 9911 1,26%
77 9534 95 9439 0,99%
78 8995 69 8925 0,77%
79 8390 49 8341 0,59%
80 7774 34 7740 0,43%
81 7253 23 7230 0,31%
82 6907 15 6892 0,21%
83 6692 9 6683 0,14%
84 6535 6 6529 0,09%
85 6291 3 6287 0,05%
86 5920 2 5919 0,03%
87 5404 1 5403 0,02%
88 4778 0 4777 0,01%
89 4129 0 4129 0,00%
90 16987 0 16987 0,00%
Total 279832 16100  5,75%
Over age 65 230648 6744  2,92%
